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Abstract
This paper studies the evolution of the distribution of opinions in a popu-
lation of individuals in which there exist two distinct subgroups of highly-
committed, well-connected opinion leaders endowed with a strong convincing
power. Each individual, located at a vertex of a directed graph, is charac-
terized by her name, the list of people she is interacting with, her level of
awareness, and her opinion. Various temporal evolutions according to dif-
ferent local rules are compared in order to find under which conditions the
formation of strongly polarized subgroups, each adopting the opinion of one
of the two groups of opinion leaders, is favored.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory, as a scientific discipline, started with the works of
the eigthteenth-century french mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda (1733-
1799) who showed that majority rules could lead to inconsistent results when
voters have to choose between three candidates. But it is only in 1951 when
Kenneth Arrow published his celebrated impossibility theorem [1], showing
that there exists no social choice rule satisfying a set of reasonable require-
ments, that social choice became a scientific discipline.
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The purpose of this paper is to describe and study models of opinion
formation under the influence of opinion leaders favoring the existence of
polarized subgroups of individuals. Although in a society each individual has
personal opinions, these opinions could, to a certain extent, change under the
influence of the opinions of the group of individuals this person is connected
to, such as family members, friends, coworkers, and other persons who by
virtue of position may exercise influence like politicians or journalists. Since
these individuals, influenced by other individuals, may also revise their own
opinions, we observe successive modifications of each individual’s opinions;
and one may reasonably ask if this iterative process leads to the formation
of consensual subgroups of people.
In democratic societies, the outcome of political elections plays an es-
sential role and it is not surprising to discover that the problem of voter
decision-making as attracted many political scientists. In 1992, John Za-
ller, in a book [2], considered as a most important contribution to political
science [3, 4], developed a theory to explain how people receive political in-
formation and determine their political preferences. Following Converse [5]
Zaller argues that most people do not have fixed positions on issues, only the
most aware individuals, who are well informed, have a consistent ideology.
In his own words “there is high variance in political awareness around a gen-
erally low mean.” Public opinion is shaped by exposure to elite discourse,
via the media, on issues with, however, significant differences in attention
to this discourse. “Political awareness denotes intellectual or cognitive en-
gagement with public affairs as against emotional or affective engagement or
no engagement at all.” The most aware individuals are more able to receive
political information but, due to their exposure to multiple and often con-
flicting messages, are more selective in accepting ideas contradicting their
basic values. The least aware individuals receive less information and are
usually more likely to be influenced. Thus, variations of political opinions
and political awareness are strongly correlated. In our model, described be-
low, the dependence of an individual’s awareness on her opinion plays an
important role.
The construction of a mathematical model of opinion dynamics implicitly
assumes that opinions can be measured. In the 1920s it was controversial
among psychologists whether attitudes could be measured. In 1928, Louis
Leon Thurstone showed that it could be done [6] and even led to important
results [7].
Recently quite a few number of agent-based models of opinion formation
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have been studied [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. In all these models as in ours, each
individual is represented by an agent whose state is a simplified description
of the individual’s characteristics.
In this paper we define and study different versions of a model of opinion
formation. We represent a society of individuals by a directed graph, that is
an ordered pair of disjoint sets (V,E), where V is a nonempty set of elements
called vertices, nodes, or points, and E a set of ordered pairs of distinct
elements of V , called directed edges, arcs, or links. Each vertex is occupied
by an individual whose state describes her name, the list of individuals she
interacts with, her level of awareness, and her opinion. The opinion of an
individual located at vertex i evolves as a result of her interactions with the
individuals located at all the vertices j ∈ V such that (i, j) ∈ E, according
to an evolution rule that takes into account opinions and levels of awareness
of the interacting individuals. All the individuals directly connected to a
given individual i form her social environment or social neighborhood. In
what follows, the words neighbor and neighborhood will not imply any spatial
proximity; a neighbor of i is just an element of her social environment who
may influence her opinion.
2 The Model
Our model of opinion formation in a population of individuals is a scale-free
social network in which each vertex is occupied by an individual. Social
networks, such as scientific collaboration networks [15], coauthorship net-
works of scientific papers [16], human sexual contacts networks [17], e-mail
addresses networks [18], are characterized by a small average shortest path
length between two randomly selected vertices, a high clustering coefficient
and, in most cases, a power-law probability distribution for the vertices’ de-
grees. [19, 20].
Each individual’s level of awareness is represented by a real number s be-
tween 0 and 1. In our model, the opinion of an individual with a high s-value
are thought to have more value; she has a strong convincing power when in-
teracting with other individuals and a high degree of “wise” skepticism when
influenced by other individuals. Concepts similar to our level of awareness
have been introduced by various authors. French [21] defines the power of
A over B (with respect to a given opinion) as the maximum force which A
can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B can mobilize
3
in the opposite directions; De Groot [22], Krause [23], and Hegselmann and
Krause [12] define a stochastic matrix of positive coefficients aij representing
the weight given by i to j that may change with time and opinions; Nowak
et al. [13] in the numerical study of a model inspired by Latane´’s theory of
social impact [14], among other attributes, characterize each individual by a
strength variable called persuasiveness. In our model, the level of awareness
of an individual is a time-independent characteristic of the individual.
For the probability distribution of levels of awareness in the society we
have chosen a bell-shaped probability density function p symmetric about
0.5 given by
p : s 7→ p(s) =
1
2piσn
exp
(s− 0.5)2
2σ2
(1)
where
σ = 0.2 and n =
∫ 1
0
exp
(x− 0.5)2
2σ2
dx = 0.9876.
Choosing σ = 0.2 makes the percentages of the population belonging to
the four groups of individuals having, respectively, a level of awareness in the
semi-open intervals [0, 0.25[, [0.25, 0.5[, [0.5, 0.75[, and [0.75, 1[ approximately
equal to 10 %, 40 %, 40 %, and 10 % (exactly 10.07, 39.93, 39.93, and 10.07).
The graph of p is represented in Figure 1.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
1
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2
Figure 1: Probability density function of the distribution of levels of aware-
ness in the population. The vertical lines delimit four different groups of
individuals (see text).
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Each individual has an opinion represented by a real number in the inter-
val ]0, 1[ uniformly distributed among all individuals. An individual’s opinion
may change at each time step according to three different probabilistic evo-
lution rules:
• 1- Adopt leader’s opinion. The individual i with a level of awareness
equal to si changes her opinion ωi with the probability (1− si)
α, where
α is a positive real which is the same for all individuals, to adopt the
opinion of the individual in her neighborhood who has the highest level
of awareness if this level of awareness is higher than her own.
• 2- Adopt weighted average opinion. The individual i with a level of
awareness equal to si changes her opinion ωi with the probability (1−
si)
α, where α is a positive real which is the same for all individuals, to
adopt the weighted average opinion of her neighbors ωi defined by
ωi =
∑
k∈neighborhood of i
skωk
∑
k∈neighborhood of i
sk
,
where sk is the level of awareness of neighbor k and ωk her opinion, the
sum being extended to all vertices k such that (i, k) is a directed link.
• 3- Adopt weighted average of neighbors’ opinions having a higher level
of awareness Same as above except that an individual i with a level
of awareness equal to si changes her opinion ωi with the probability
(1 − si)
α to adopt the weighted average opinion of the subgroup of
neighbors having a higher level of awareness than her own. This last
rule is a sort of compromise between the two previous ones.
We also considered slightly different versions of the evolution rules just
described in which the probabilistic condition is replaced by a threshold
condition. That is, an individual i, instead of adopting a new opinion with a
probability equal to (1 − si)
4, adopts a new opinion if, and only if, the new
opinion does not differ from her own by more that (1 − si)
α, where α, as
mentioned above, is the same positive real for all individuals.
Note that for both probabilistic and threshold conditions, the exponent
α characterizes the level of skepticism of the society as a whole. Increasing
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its value increases the level of skepticism of the whole population and makes
it more difficult to convince. The exponent α can therefore be viewed as a
cultural trait of the society. In our numerical simulations we took α = 4.
Note also that the expressions of both versions of the evolution rules show
that individuals with a low level of awareness are much easier to convince than
individuals with a high level of awareness. The least aware individuals, that
is, in our model, the individuals with a small level of awareness are responsible
of the observed fickleness of voters in polls during election campaigns.
To sum up, in our models, a social network model is represented by
a directed graph with N nodes. Each node is occupied by an individual
characterized by
1- her name: an integer between 1 and N ;
2- her social environment : a list of the individuals (called neighbors) she
interacts with;
3- her level of awareness s: a real in the semi-open interval [0, 1[;
4- her opinion ω: a real in the open interval ]0, 1[.
The size of each neighborhood is a random integer uniformly distributed
between 1 and a maximum value nmax = 7 (implying an average number
of neighbors equal to 4). An individual k belongs to the neighborhood of
individual i 6= k if the directed link (i, k) belongs to the set E of graph’s edges.
While vertices out-degrees are uniformly distributed between 1 and nmax = 7,
the random selection of neighbors is such that vertices in-degrees have a
Pareto probability distribution with a minimum value parameter x0 = 1 and
a shape parameter σ = 2. The probability distribution of in-degrees has,
therefore, a cumulative distribution function given by x 7→ 1 − x−2, and a
density function equal to x 7→ 2x−3.1
To complete the definition of the model, we define a subgroup of indi-
viduals called opinion leaders. This subgroup consists of the rN individuals
located at the nodes having the highest in-degrees, that is, the individuals
1The cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution with a minimum value
parameter equal to x0 and a shape parameter equal to σ is
x 7→ 1−
(
x0
x
)
σ
.
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who belong to more neighborhoods. More precisely, each individual of the
fraction r of the total number N of individuals, selected among those having
the highest in-degrees, is assigned a level of awareness s = 1 and, with a
probability 1
2
, an opinion either equal to Ω or 1 − Ω. This subnetwork of
opinion leaders is, therefore, the group of the most influential individuals.
Since their level of awareness is equal to 1, they never change opinion during
the temporal evolution of the system. They represent a group of commmitted
individuals firmly attached to their opinion.
For example, in a population of 1000 individuals, with Ω = 0.4, the states
of individuals 587 and 723 could be given by
{587, {426, 802, 977, 679}, 0.604395, 0.543928}
{723, {770, 91, 367, 313, 967, 349, 68}, 1.0, 0.6}.
Individual 587 has 4 neighbors—individuals 426, 802, 977, and 679—, a level
of awareness s587 = 0.604395, and an opinion ω587 = 0.543928, whereas
individual 723 is an opinion leader who has 7 neighbors—individuals 770,
91, 367, 313, 967, 349, and 68—, a level of awareness s723 = 1.0, and an
opinion ω587 = 1− Ω = 0.6.
At each time step, for all integers i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, the opinion ωi of
individual i evolves according to one of the six evolution rules mentioned
above. In a more general model we could consider that each individual has
various opinions on different issues and apply similar evolution rules to each
opinion.
3 Numerical results
We performed several runs of the six different evolution rules applied to 20
different initial societies of 1000 individuals having a fraction r = 0.1 of
committed individuals with a level of awareness equal to 1.2 These individ-
uals have, with a probability 1
2
, an opinion either equal to Ω = 0.4 or to
1 − Ω = 0.6. The levels of awareness of the remaining part of the popu-
lation are randomly distributed following the probability density function p
given by (1). According to whether her level of awareness belongs to one of
the following semi-open intervals: [0, 0.25[, [0.25, 0.5[, [0.5, 0.75[, or [0.75, 1[,
2In order to check our results we also made a few numerical simulations on larger
societies of 10,000 individuals.
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we say that the individual belongs to group 1, 2, 3 or 4. Following Zaller,
chosing α = 4 implies that individuals in group 1 have a particularly low
level of awareness and are, therefore, very easy to convince, whereas indi-
viduals in group 4 have a high level of awareness and are especially difficult
to convince. Groups 2 and 3 represent the majority; they have a moderate
level of awareness and are more or less easy to convince according to whether
they belong to group 2 or 3. The average distribution of opinions in the 20
initial societies is represented in Figure 2 and the percentages of individuals
belonging to the different groups are given in Table 1. In order to compare
the different evolution rules, all the reported numerical results were obtained
starting from the same 20 initial populations of 1000 individuals.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
2
4
6
8
10
Figure 2: Histogram of the distribution of opinions averaged over the 20
initial societies.
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 0.4 group 0.6
8.87 36.27 35.63 9.23 5.02 4.98
Table 1: Percentages of the total population belonging to each group; groups
0.4 and 0.6 denote the groups of strongly committed individuals having a level
of awareness equal to 1 and an opinion either equal to 0.4 or 0.6.
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3.1 Rule 1: Adopt leader’s opinion with a probabilistic
condition
Starting from the 20 different initial populations of 1000 individuals described
above, we studied their temporal evolutions assuming that each individual
i with level of awareness si adopts the opinion of her neighbor having the
highest level of awareness with a probability (1−si)
4 if, and only if, this level
of awareness is higher than her own.
After 500 time steps, as shown in Figure 3, most individuals have adopted
either the opinion Ω = 0.4 or the opinion 1 − Ω = 0.6. The two peaks
at 0.4 and 0.6 correspond, respectively, to 42.61% and 39.51% of the total
population. These values include the percentages of opinion leaders (refer to
Table 1). Note that opinion leaders with opinion 0.4, who are slightly more
numerous, eventually convinced more people to adopt their opinion than the
opinion 0.6 of the other group of opinion leaders.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
20
40
60
80
Figure 3: Histogram of the average distribution of opinions at t = 500 when
opinions evolve according to Rule 1.
Except very few of them (0.025%), all individuals belonging to group 1
(less aware) changed opinion. Those who did not change, were found to
have only one neighbor having a lower level of awareness than their own.
According to Rule 1, these individuals could not change opinion.
Highly committed individuals have a strong influence on the formation of
opinion in societies evolving according to Rule 1. This rule leads to polarized
societies divided into two consensual subgroups.
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3.2 Rule 2: Adopt weighted average with a probabilis-
tic condition
Starting from the same 20 initial populations of 1000 individuals we studied
their temporal evolution assuming that an individual i with level of awareness
si and opinion ω1 adopts the average opinion ωi of her neighborhood with a
probability (1− si)
4.
It is clear that if all individuals changing opinion adopt the weighted
average opinion of their neighbors, they tend towards adopting opinions dis-
tributed around 0.5 as illustrated by the histogram (Figure 4). After 500
time steps, compared to what has been observed in the case of Rule 1, even
though more individuals did change opinion much less have finally adopted
the opinions 0.4 and 0.6 promoted by the most influential individuals. As a
matter of fact, only 3.14% and 2.7% changed opinion to respectively adopt
opinions 0.4 and 0.6.
As suggested above, we observed the formation of an important group
(74.07%) of individuals having an opinion in the open interval ]0.4, 0.6[ with
a central peak at 0.5 (see Figure 4). The percentages of individuals having
an opinion either less than 0.4 or greater than 0.6 are only equal to 5.71%
and 4.41% respectively.
Compared to Rule 1 in which an individual adopts the opinion of her
neighbor with the highest level of awareness if this level of awareness is higher
than her own, in the case of Rule 2, an individual adopts the weighted av-
erage opinion of her neighbors with no restrictive condition. It is, therefore,
not surprising to find that more individuals did change opinion during the
evolution according to Rule 2 than during the evolution according to Rule 1.
Actually all individuals of groups 1 and 2, that is, all individuals having a
level of awareness less than 0.5, changed opinion. Moreover the vast majority
of individuals belonging to group 3, that is, 99.05% of the total number of
individuals belonging to this group, changed opinion. As expected, among
the more aware individuals belonging to group 4, who are more difficult to
convince, only 40.9% of them changed opinion.
In order to verify the formation of a growing group of individuals hav-
ing an opinion in the open interval ]0.4, 0.6[ we analyzed the distribution of
opinions after 1000 time steps and found that the percentage of individu-
als having an opinion in the open interval ]0.4, 0.6[ slightly increased from
74.07% to 76.4% of the total population. The histogram of the distribution
of opinions after 1000 time steps is very similar to the histogram obtained
10
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Figure 4: Histogram of the distribution of opinions at t = 500 when opinions
evolve according to Rule 2.
after 500 time steps. The temporal evolution is, therefore, rather slow and
after 1000 time steps we are close to the steady state. Table 2 gives, for
each group, the percentages of individuals who did not change opinion after,
respectively, 500 and 1000 time steps. Note that these percentages refer to
the number of individuals in each group.
time group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4
500 0 0 0.95 59.1
1000 0 0 0.03 43.5
Table 2: Rule 2: percentages of the number of individuals in each group who
did not change opinion after, respectively, 500 and 1000 time steps.
3.3 Rule 3: Adopt different weighted averages depend-
ing upon group membership with a probabilistic
condition
Considering the assumption that individuals with lower levels of awareness
are less aware than individuals with higher levels of awareness, we suppose
that individuals belonging to groups 1 and 2, that is, individuals with a
level of awareness s < 0.5 may change their opinion to adopt the weighted
11
average opinion of all their neighbors with a probability (1 − s)4, whereas
individuals belonging to groups 3 and 4, that is, individuals with a level of
awareness s ≥ 0.5 may change their opinion to adopt the weighted average
opinion of their neighbors having a higher level of awareness than their own
with a probability (1 − s)4. An individual has a higher level of awareness
than all her neighbors never changes opinion. This mixed rule tries to take
into account the fact that less aware individuals do not have fixed positions
on political issues whereas more aware individuals, having a more consistent
ideology, may only be influenced by the elite.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
5
10
15
20
25
Figure 5: Histogram of the distribution of opinions at time t = 500 when the
populations evolve according to mixed Rule 3.
In Figure 5, representing the histogram of the average distribution of
opinions after 500 time steps, we observe, as in the case of Rule 2, a rela-
tively important but, however, less pronounced group (56.33 % of the total
population) of individuals having an opinion in the open interval ]0.4, 0.6[
with a marked central peak at 0.5 (3.68% of the total population). Increas-
ing the number of iterations up to 2000 confirms this feature (see Figure 6).
The temporal evolution is, here again, rather slow, the central peak, for in-
stance, grows from 3.68% to 4.15% of the total population when the number
of time steps increases from 500 to 2000. The evolutions according to Rules
2 and 3 are quite similar.
Table 3 gives, for each group, the percentages of individuals who did not
change opinion after, respectively, 500 and 2000 time steps. These percent-
ages refer to the number of individuals in each group.
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Figure 6: Histogram of the distribution of opinions at time t = 2000 when
the populations evolve according to mixed Rule 3.
time group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4
500 0 0 13.72 68.09
2000 0 0 13.02 46.32
Table 3: Rule 3: percentages of the number of individuals in each group who
did not change opinion after, respectively, 500 and 2000 time steps.
3.4 Rule 4: Adopt Leader’s Opinion with a Threshold
Condition
Starting from the same 20 initial populations we study their temporal evo-
lution assuming that an individual with level of awareness s and opinion ω
adopts the opinion ωleader of her neighbor having the highest level of aware-
ness sleader if sleader > s and the relation |ω − ωleader| < (1− s)
4 is satisfied.
Imposing a threshold condition and requiring that the individual to be
convinced should have a level of awareness inferior to the level of awareness of
the neighbor with the highest one slows down the evolution of the distribution
of opinions as illustrated on Figure 7. Except for the two peaks at 0.4 and 0.6
that represent respectively, in this case, only 13.07% and 12.4% of the total
population, the remaining part of the distribution is approximately uniform.
The percentages of individuals in each group who have not changed opinion
after 500 time steps are, respectively equal to 17.99%, 71.97%, 94.8%, and
13
99.95%. For the moderately aware and more aware individuals of groups 2,
3, and 4, these percentages are rather high.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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Figure 7: Histogram of the distribution of opinions at time t = 500 when the
populations evolve according to Rule 3.
3.5 Rule 5: AdoptWeighted Average with a Threshold
Condition
Starting from the same 20 initial populations of 1000 individuals we study
their temporal evolution assuming that an individual with level of awareness
s and opinion ω adopts the average opinion ω of her neighborhood if the
relation |ω − ω| < (1− s)4 is satisfied.
Here again, as for Rule 4, we observe a slower evolution of the distribu-
tion of opinions according to Rule 5 when we impose a threshold condition
instead of a probabilistic one (see Figure 8). Much less individuals changed
opinion compared to what was observed when the system evolved, following
Rule 2 (see Table 4). The two peaks at 0.4 and 0.6 represent just 5.68% and
5.58% respectively, that is, a mere 1.39% of the total population (excluding
opinion leaders) has adopted one of the two opinions promoted by opinion
leaders. The central group of the individuals with an opinion in the open in-
terval ]0.4, 0.6[ is also much less evident, only 22.02% of the total population
compared to the 74.07% when the system evolved following Rule 2.
As we did in the case of Rule 2, we increased the number of time steps
to see if the hardly visible small bump centered around opinion 0.5 in the
14
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Figure 8: Histogram of the distribution of opinions at t = 500 when opinions
evolve according to Rule 5.
time group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4
500 16.92 69.86 93.81 99.73
Table 4: Rule 5: percentages of the number of individuals in each group who
did not change opinion after 500 time steps.
histogram of the distribution of opinions (Figure 8) would grow. Actually
nothing changed, we reobtain exactly the same numbers, that is, after 500
time steps the system had already reached a steady state.
3.6 Rule 6: Adopt different weighted averages depend-
ing upon group membership with a threshold con-
dition
Starting from the same 20 initial populations of 1000 individuals we study
their temporal evolution assuming that an individual with level of awareness
s < 0.5 and an opinion ω may change her opinion to adopt the weighted
average opinion ω of all her neighbors if the condition |ω − ω| < (1 − s)4
is satisfied, whereas an individual with level of awareness s ≥ 0.5 and an
opinion ω may change her opinion to adopt the weighted average opinion
ωleaders of their neighbors having a higher level of awareness than her own if
the condition |ω − ωleaders| < (1− s)
4 is satisfied.
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As already observed for Rules 4 and 5, imposing a threshold condition
slows down the evolution and generate a small central group of individuals
with opinions around 0.5 as illustrated in Figure 9 and Table 5.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
200
400
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Figure 9: Histogram of the distribution of opinions at t = 500 when opinions
evolve according to Rule 6.
time group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4
500 17 69.86 94.91 100
Table 5: Rule 6: percentages of the number of individuals in each group who
did not change opinion after 500 time steps.
The evolution of the distribution of opinions according to Rules 5 and
6 are very similar (compare results given in Tables 4 and 5). Actually, the
individuals changing opinions belong essentially to groups 1 and 2, and these
individuals evolve exactly in the same manner for both Rules 5 and 6.
4 Conclusion
We have studied the evolution of the distribution of opinions of 20 differ-
ent 1000-individual societies in which each individual, located at a vertex
of a directed graph, is characterized by her name (an integer in the range
[1, 1000]), the list of people she is interacting with, her level of awareness
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(a real s between 0 and 1), and her opinion (a real ω between 0 and 1).
The out-degree of a vertex, representing the number of persons who may
influence the opinion of the individual located at that vertex, is a random
number uniformly distributed between 1 and nmax = 7. The in-degree of a
vertex, representing the number of persons who may be influenced by the
opinion of the individual located at that vertex, is a random number Pareto
distributed with a minimum value parameter x0 = 1 and a shape parameter
σ = 2. The resulting power-law behavior of the in-degrees implies that there
exist individuals who may influence a large number of other individuals. The
group rN = 100 individuals having the highest in-degrees, is assigned a level
of awareness s = 1 and, with a probability 1
2
, an opinion either equal to
Ω = 0.4 or 1− Ω = 0.6. This subnetwork of the most influential individuals
are opinion leaders who never change opinion during temporal evolutions of
the system. The evolution rules are of three different types. An individual
can either adopt the opinion of the individual, among those she is connected
to, who has the highest level of awareness if this level of awareness is higher
than her own or adopt the weighted average of the opinions of all the individ-
uals she is connected to or adopt the weighted average of the opinions of the
individuals having a higher level of awareness than her own among those she
is connected to. Each of these rules has two versions. An individual with a
level of awareness s may either adopt a new opinion with a probability equal
to (1−s)4 or adopt a new opinion if this opinion differs from her own by less
than (1 − s)4. The choice of the power 4 makes individuals with a level of
awareness less than 0.25 very easy to convince and individuals with a level
of awareness greater than 0.75 extremely reluctant to adopt a new opinion.
All numerical simulations have shown that the temporal evolution ac-
cording to Rule 1 (which consists, for a person with level of awareness s, to
adopt, with a probability (1 − s)4, the opinion of the individual having the
highest level of awareness among those she is connected to when the leader’s
level of awareness is higher than her own) leads very quickly to the forma-
tion of two important, roughly equivalent, polarized consensual subgroups
of individuals having either the opinion 0.4 or the opinion 0.6, whereas the
temporal evolution according to Rule 5 (which consists, for a person with
level of awareness s and an opinion ω, to adopt the weighted average opinion
ω of the individuals she is connected to if the condition |ω− ω| < (1− s)4 is
verified) leads rather slowly to a much less polarized society with the forma-
tion of a group of individuals having a bell-shaped distribution of opinions
centered at 0.5 accompanied by less pronounced peaks corresponding to the
17
two groups of opinion leaders.
The formation of polarized consensual subgroups seems therefore to reveal
that people are essentially influenced by opinion leaders (elite discourse) con-
veyed through the media by, for example, politicians and journalists, whereas
the formation of a group with opinions distributed around a median opinion
appears to be the result of interactions with closely related individuals such
as family members, friends and coworkers.
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